For their part, the Pakistanis have long viewed the F as a potent symbol of where they stand with the United States. Like the Indians, they afford it an outsized military and political significance.
February 4,5: Brookings Institution Press, In many aspects, India and Pakistan are not exceptional. Like so many other former European colonies, they struggle to reconcile modern borders with ancient identities.
Elites govern at the expense of ordinary citizens. Foreign countries feature prominently in their economic and political activities, especially as India and Pakistan seek to compete at a global level.
In this light, India and Pakistan seem no different than the many postcolonial states scattered throughout Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. What makes India and Pakistan special, however, is how much they hate each other. Despite numerous fits and starts at rapprochement, the countries have reconciled little in the nearly seven decades since independence from the British.
Instead, they have moved in the opposite direction, strategically crafting national identities and policies along a singular concept: In Shooting for a Century: The British crown assumed direct control in over the subcontinent, and did more damage in ", when it partitioned India and decamped.
At partition, "Indian princes were advised by the British to choose either India or Pakistan…and the rush to force them to join one or the other ignited several significant conflicts. Since independence, however, India and Pakistan have sustained and deepened the rivalry to be just as culpable as the British.
Today the two countries have three wars between them, a game of proxies inside Afghanistan, and a nuclear arms race, as well as a smattering of disputes over territory, water, and trade.
Cohen thoroughly explains these problems and ironies, offering several explanations: But the real strength of Shooting for a Century is its ability to detail the often-enigmatic psychology of the conflict in both Indian and Pakistani minds.
By taking this approach, he invokes a historical sense of togetherness that is often neglected in the discussions of the conflict. Indian political psychologist Ashis Nandy has eloquently described this paradox: Yet the book offers no new ideas.
Ironically, Cohen spends most of the book detailing the intractability of the conflict, claiming chances are high it will never be resolved, only to include a chapter on "Prospects. It is at this point that Shooting for a Century becomes repetitive, and the continued onslaught of reasons why India and Pakistan hate each other begin to fatigue the reader.
Cohen does acknowledge that a "qualified optimism is emerging on both sides and enthusiasm among Pakistanisespecially after the decision in to accept Indian trade terms. Trade normalization alone will not fix everything because, as Cohen points out, any prospect of major breakthroughs can easily "be blown apart" by serious miscalculations, faulty foreign interventions, or terrorism.
There are too many spoilers between India and Pakistan for one facet of their relationship to become an all-encompassing solution for peace.
Cohen mentions dialogues between former policymakers and civil society organizations, backchannel discussions between government officials, and foreign efforts to normalize, but concludes that none of them will work.
Instead, he makes a prediction: He dismisses as insignificant the ongoing efforts to collaborate on energy, the environment, and accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Cohen could have written a more succinct book with a sharper argument, his reasoning is right on the mark.
During the Cold War, Pakistan accepted millions of dollars in U. The Americans and Soviets were able to use India and Pakistan in their cold war fight, while the Indians and Pakistanis used their external allies to strengthen conventional military capabilities against the other.
Blaming the Americans Cohen begins the book by blaming the British and ends it with blaming the Americans. In the final chapter on "American Interests and Policies," he writes, "the Obama administration failed to develop a South Asia policy that would have encompassed both India-Pakistan relations including Kashmir and the grinding war in Afghanistan.
Holbrooke, was persona non grata in India, where "Indian officials were so irritated with his mandate that they made it inconvenient for Holbrooke to visit New Delhi. But Holbrooke was keen on taking a regional approach — something that the Pakistanis themselves welcomed.
Pakistan has always wanted the United States to serve as mediator in its conflict with India. The India policy apparatus within the U. Holbrooke finally made it to India in July By that time, he understood that getting it right in Afghanistan meant that India and Pakistan had to start talking — and President Obama and Hillary Clinton agreed.
Holbrooke wanted to host a "quadrilateral" dialogue between the United States, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan that would be similar to the trilateral dialogue he had initiated between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
It was the only way, Holbrooke thought, to fix Afghanistan, where India-Pakistan tensions bolstered local conflicts.
Despite minor fits and starts until the day Holbrooke died in December that year, the talks never happened. Part of the problem went back to what Cohen calls American "organizational pathologies," such as the creation of the SRAP office, which was debilitating for South Asia policy as a whole.
It led to "segmented and uncoordinated policymaking," in which offices covering India and Pakistan in the State Department and White House were unable to reconcile opposing viewpoints, became overly turf-conscious, and took on client-like relationships with the countries they worked on.
The memory of the attacks lingered, and lethargic legal systems in both countries meant justice was slow.Home/Pakistan Army/ The Current Relationship Between India and Pakistan. Pakistan Army Pakistan China Pakistan City Pakistan Defence Pakistan Destinations Pakistan News Pakistan People The Current Relationship Between India and Pakistan.
Abdullah Stanikzai May 10, Pakistan, India, China; SAARC, BIMSTEC, BRI: A crowded political landscape for Nepal to navigate.
Khan has a golden chance to right ties with India.
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Nuclear-armed Pakistan is an important center of radical Islamic ideas and groups. India–United States relations (or Indo-American relations) refers to the international relations that exist between the Republic of India and the United States of America..
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